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Abstract: Recent declarations by the Court of Appeal indicate that the inherent jurisdiction has 
survived the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 for adults considered 
‘vulnerable’ and whose decision-making is threatened by reasons other than mental impairment 
– such occasions may include instances of elder abuse. In this paper I argue, however, that the 
post-Mental Capacity Act courts have adopted a confused and outmoded concept of the 
vulnerable older adult, in particular where decision-making is threatened by abusive 
interpersonal relationships experienced by an older individual.  This has particular implications 
in terms of the types of remedies imposed by the courts on older adults in such circumstances.  
In this article I suggest that by being more cognisant of recent more nuanced understandings of 
vulnerability, the courts may be better suited to identifying, and responding to perceived 
sources of vulnerability in a way that is more empowering for the older adult. 
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Introduction 
The mistreatment of older adults, sometimes termed ‘elder abuse’ is frequently 
defined as ‘a single or repeated act or lack of appropriate action, occurring within any 
relationship where there is an expectation of trust, which causes harm or distress to an 
older person’ (World Health Organisation, 2002, p. 3; see also Dixon et al., 2010) and 
encompasses a broad spectrum of abuse such as psychological, physical, financial and 
sexual. Recent studies (O’Keeffe et al., 2007) place the prevalence of such abuse as 
between 2.6%-4%.  The impact such abuse has on an older individual, and 
particularly an older adult’s decision making ability, is becoming an increasing 
concern for policy-makers and academics alike, with emphasis being placed on how 
such abuse may engender a fear of reprisals in its victims, as well as affecting their 
self-esteem and self-worth (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2007, ch. 8; Mowlam, 
Tennant, Dixon & McCreadie, 2007, ch. 5-6; Pritchard-Jones, 2014).  Before 1 April 
2015, identifying and responding to the domestic abuse of older persons was a matter 
left to local authorities, under the No Secrets (Department of Health, 2000) guidance 
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published in 2000. This minimal approach to safeguarding has been heavily criticised; 
in 2011 the Law Commission reported that ‘[t]he existing legal framework for adult 
protection is “neither systematic nor coordinated, reflecting the sporadic development 
of safeguarding policy over the last 25 years”’ (Law Commission, 2011, para. 2.1). 
As a consequence, calls were made for a comprehensive statutory safeguarding 
scheme (Herring, 2012; Williams, 2008), which the Care Act 2014 now aims (but as 
shown below, fails) to achieve by placing an obligation on local authorities to make 
enquiries where an adult who, by virtue of their ‘needs’ is considered at risk (s.42 
Care Act 2014).1 
  
At the same time, it is now beyond doubt that the High Court’s inherent 
jurisdiction has survived the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act (KC v 
Westminster City Council [2008] EWCA Civ 198; DL v A Local Authority [2012] 
EWCA Civ 253), and exists alongside the Act to protect those whose decision-making 
is threatened by reasons other than an ‘impairment of, or disturbance in the 
functioning of the mind, or brain’ (Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.2(1)), or to authorise a 
detention of those who do not come within the deprivation of liberty safeguards under 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (An NHS Trust v Dr A [2013] EWHC 2442 (COP)). 
According to Munby J: 
 
…the inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in relation to a vulnerable adult who, even 
if not incapacitated by mental disorder or mental illness, is, or is reasonably believed 
to be, either (i) under constraint or (ii) subject to coercion or undue influence or (iii) 
for some other reason deprived of the capacity to make the relevant decision, or 
disabled from making a free choice, or incapacitated or disabled from giving or 
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expressing a real and genuine consent. (Re SA (Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: 
Marriage) [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam) at para. 77) 
 
Central to the more recent interpretations of the inherent jurisdiction, then, is this 
notion of the ‘vulnerable adult’ and despite the long history of this term in law and 
policy, it is only recently that the philosophical literature has begun to grapple with 
what it means to be ‘vulnerable’, and question its predominant construction in this 
context.  The recent arguments put forward are that vulnerability is both universal and 
particular (Fineman, 2008; Fineman & Grear, 2013); a feature that is inherent in all 
persons by virtue of our embodiment albeit experienced differently by each 
individual, rather than a term to denote certain sub-groups of the population such as 
the elderly or those with physical or cognitive impairments.   
 
If existing safeguarding law and policy fails to make sufficient attempt at 
providing a comprehensive statutory framework for tackling such abuse, and its effect 
on decision-making, as commentators have noted (Clements, 2015; Collingbourne, 
2014), then it may well be that the inherent jurisdiction is increasingly resorted to by 
local authorities and the courts to safeguard those older adults who experience 
abusive interpersonal relationships that affect their decision-making, and who do not 
fall within the scope of the Mental Capacity Act.  Indeed the Court of Appeal has 
recently noted as such; ‘[t]here is, in my view, a sound and strong public policy 
justification for [the retention of the inherent jurisdiction alongside the Mental 
Capacity Act].  The existence of ‘elder abuse’… is sadly all too easy to contemplate’ 
(DL v A Local Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 253 at para. 63). In light of this it is 
important for the courts invoking the inherent jurisdiction have a clear and consistent 
approach as to who it considers a ‘vulnerable older adult’.  This paper builds upon 
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recent literature applying the ‘new’ vulnerability analysis in other domains (Clough, 
2014; Mackenzie & Rogers, 2013; Peroni & Timmer, 2013; Stychin, 2012), as well as 
existing critiques of the inherent jurisdiction (Dunn, Clare & Holland, 2008; Herring, 
2009), by exploring recent case law involving older adults, and in particular by 
focusing on three key cases2; DL ([2011] EWHC 1022 (Fam); [2012] EWCA Civ 
253), London Borough of Redbridge v G ([2014] EWCOP 17; [2014] EWCOP 485; 
[2014] EWCOP 959; [2014] EWCOP 1361) and NCC v PB and TB ([2014] EWCOP 
14).  By focusing on these cases I argue that the courts are using an outmoded and 
confused concept of vulnerability in relation to older adults, and that this, given the 
‘theoretically limitless’ (Re B (Secure accommodation: Inherent jurisdiction) (No. 1) 
[2013] EWHC 4654 (Fam) at para. 20) remedies available under the jurisdiction, is 
problematic in terms of the responses it envisages for instances of such abuse. By 
adopting a more nuanced and consistent account of vulnerability, the courts may be 
better suited to identifying the complex nature of decision-making for older adults3 
who experience abuse, and will therefore be able to respond more appropriately in 
such instances. 
 
The legal context of the vulnerable adult 
The historical background  
In 1990 the House of Lords, asserting the inherent jurisdiction, held that treatment on 
a mentally incapacitated adult would be lawful as long as it was necessary, and it was 
to be deemed necessary if it was in her best interests (Re F (Mental Patient: 
Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1).  Subsequently, there followed a number of cases 
authorising (or authorising the withdrawal of) medical treatment under the inherent 
jurisdiction for individuals who were considered unable to give valid consent by 
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reason of mental incapacity (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993) AC 789; Re MB 
(Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426; Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow 
Donation) [1997] Fam 110;) or because of coercion or undue influence (Re T (Adult: 
Refusal of Treatment) (1992) EWCA Civ 18).  That the use of the jurisdiction was 
confined only to medical treatment seemed beyond doubt in 1995 by Hale J (as she 
then was) in Cambridgeshire County Council v R (An Adult) ([1995] 1 FLR 50).  In 
this case, the local authority sought declarations in respect of the family of a 21-year-
old woman in its care that, inter alia, it would be lawful to prevent her family 
contacting her.   Hale J held that the declaratory jurisdiction could only be invoked to 
protect a legal right, and not to limit an individual’s freedom of association4.  Since 
then, however, the scope of the jurisdiction has been extended further by the courts in 
two marked directions.  Firstly, following Re F ([2000] EWCA Civ 192), where the 
Court of Appeal upheld declarations sought by the local authority to restrict the 
contact of an abused young woman who had a low intellectual age with her natural 
family, the jurisdiction has been extended to cover decisions other than medical 
treatment, such as deprivations of liberty5 (R v Bournewood Community and Mental 
Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458; An NHS Trust v Dr A [2013] EWHC 
2442 (COP)), contact (Re G [2004] EWHC 2222 (Fam); Re S [2002] EWHC 2278 
(Fam)), residence (Re F [2000] EWCA Civ 192; Re S [2003] EWHC 1909 (Fam)), 
marriage (Re SK [2004] EWHC 3202 (Fam); Re SA [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam)) and 
publication restraint (Local Authority v Health Authority [2004] 1 All ER 480).   
 
Moreover - and particularly important now that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
provides the legislative framework for decision-making for those who are deemed to 
lack capacity ‘because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the 
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mind or brain’ (S.2(1)) - the scope of the jurisdiction has seemingly affirmed the early 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Re T (1992) EWCA Civ 18, and has been extended 
to adults who are deemed unable to make decisions for reasons other than mental 
impairment; more recently called ‘vulnerable adults’. In Re G (Re G [2004] EWHC 
2222 (Fam)) for example, the court was asked to determine whether the jurisdiction 
could be used to make residence and contact orders for a 29 year old woman, G, who 
had a history of mental illness and had previously been subjected to a guardianship 
order under section 7 of the Mental Health Act 1983.  The court held, notwithstanding 
the fact that at the time of the hearing G had regained mental capacity as to her 
contact and residence, that the inherent jurisdiction could still be used to grant the 
declarations sought – a failure to do so would mean that G’s condition would almost 
certainly deteriorate and she would lack capacity again.  Similarly, in Re SA (Re SA 
[2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam)) the question for the Family Division was whether the 
jurisdiction could be invoked to protect an 18 year old who suffered from profound 
communication difficulties from an unsuitable arranged marriage in Pakistan, 
notwithstanding the fact that she had capacity to marry.  In finding that it could be 
invoked, Munby J held that: 
 
A vulnerable adult who does not suffer from any kind of mental incapacity may 
nonetheless be entitled to the protection of the inherent jurisdiction if he is, or is 
reasonably believed to be, incapacitated from making the relevant decision by reason 
of such things as constraint, coercion, undue influence or other vitiating factors. (Re 
SA at para. 79)  
 
Who is the ‘vulnerable’ adult? 
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So whom does the law have in mind when it speaks of ‘vulnerable’? Central to the 
notion of vulnerability deployed by the courts, is the notion of an inherent 
characteristic meeting a risk of harm.  According to Munby J in Re SA, an adult is 
deemed to be vulnerable if he or she is ‘unable to take care of him or herself, or 
unable to protect him or herself against signiﬁcant harm or exploitation, or who is 
deaf, blind, or dumb, or who is substantially handicapped by illness, injury or 
congenital deformity’ (Re SA at para. 82) 6.   In light of this, Munby J goes on to say 
that ‘SA is plainly a vulnerable adult. She is substantially handicapped by her 
disabilities. And, particularly because she is deaf and dumb, she may well be unable 
to take care of herself and protect herself against significant harm or exploitation…’ 
(Re SA at para. 120).  The approach adopted by Munby J in Re SA has been cited with 
approval by subsequent courts grappling with cases involving older adults (City of 
Sunderland v PS and CA [2007] EWHC 623 (Fam); DL v A Local Authority & Ors 
[2012] EWCA Civ 253), and is one that is not uncommon more generally in the case 
law. In LBL v RYJ (LBL v RYJ & Anor [2010] EWHC 2665 (COP)) for example, 
which involved capacity determinations in respect of a young woman who had 
suffered brain damage at birth and had significant learning difficulties, the court cites 
a report prepared by the educational psychologist which states that ‘"[the individual] 
has an extremely low IQ, unlikely to be capable of leading a fully independent adult 
life and in this respect will need help, support and care for the foreseeable future. Her 
limitations make her vulnerable’ (LBL v RYJ at para. 38). Similarly, in Local 
Authority X v MM and KM (Local Authority X v MM and KM [2007] EWHC 2003 
(Fam)), the issue was whether MM, who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and a 
moderate learning disability, had decision-making capacity with regard to, inter alia, 
residence, contact, and marriage. In his decision, Munby J again ties vulnerability to 
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being at risk of abuse and states that ‘the appropriate role of the law here is to protect 
the vulnerable, who as such may become easy targets for abuse or who may find 
themselves in exploitative contexts…’ (Local Authority X v MM and KM at para. 
130). In doing so, he refers to the case of Dudgeon v UK (Dudgeon v UK (1981) 4 
EHRR 149).  Albeit a case that involved the criminalisation of homosexuality, the 
European Court of Human Rights in Dudgeon offers an illustrative account of 
vulnerability as deriving from an inherent characteristic, which is cited with approval 
by Munby J: 
 
There can be no denial that some degree of regulation…can be justified as 
"necessary in a democratic society"…"to provide sufficient safeguards against 
exploitation and corruption of others, particularly those who are specially vulnerable 
because they are young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced, or in a state of special 
physical, official or economic dependence." (Dudgeon v UK (1981) 4 EHRR 149 at 
para. 49)7  
 
Moreover, Munby J’s approach in Local Authority X v MM and KM automatically ties 
being ‘elderly’ in with being ‘vulnerable’ – in paragraph 120 alone he links being 
‘elderly’ with being ‘vulnerable’ together three times.   
 
This approach to vulnerability – the presence of an inherent characteristic 
found in an individual such as their old age or a cognitive impairment, which is 
deemed to bring with it a risk of harm - is also one that arises in other legal contexts 
involving older adults.  In Watts v UK (Watts v UK (2010) 51 EHRR SE5) for 
example, which involved a challenge by a 106-year old woman to the proposed 
closure of her care home, the court states that: 
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[T]he presence of cognitive impairments…makes the individual particularly 
vulnerable, for no matter how much work is done to explain the situation and to 
help them come to terms with the situation, all that work may be lost because of 
the failure to register and to remember…these vulnerability factors increase the 
risk of adverse reactions to the relocation stress... (Watts v UK (2010) 51 EHRR 
SE5 at para. 53)8 
 
In LLBC v TH, JG and KR (LLBC v TG, JG and KR [2007] EWHC 2640 (Fam)), a 
case concerning the residence of TG, a 78 year old gentleman with dementia, 
vulnerability is linked to the fact that TG is ‘elderly’ and ‘infirm’ (LLBC v TG, JG 
and KR at para. 40).  This idea that a vulnerable adult is someone who is unable to 
protect herself because of an inherent characteristic, such as age or cognitive 
impairment, is also one that appears in adult safeguarding policy more generally.  No 
Secrets, the safeguarding policy framework recently superseded by the Care Act 
2014, defined a vulnerable adult as: 
 
[S]omeone who is or may be in need of community care services by reason of 
mental or other disability, age or illness; and who is or may be unable to take 
care of him or herself, or unable to protect him or herself against significant 
harm or exploitation (emphasis added). (Department of Health, 2000, para. 2.3)9  
 
Similarly, section 42 of the Care Act 2014 now places a statutory obligation on local 
authorities to make enquiries where it has reasonable cause to suspect that an adult is 
in need of care and support, is experiencing or is at risk of experiencing abuse or 
neglect, and the needs that the individual has render him or her unable to protect him 
or herself from the abuse or neglect (S.42(1)(a)-(c) Care Act 2014).10 Both the 
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approach taken to vulnerability by the inherent jurisdiction cases (and the broader 
cases) then, as well as the policy and statutory provisions surveyed here, present 
vulnerability as being at risk because of an inherent characteristic – or, more recently 
under the Care Act 2014, because of something that renders them ‘in need’ of care 
and support – an impairment, so to speak.  In effect, vulnerability depends first and 
foremost on the existence of an inherent characteristic, which then renders an adult at 
risk of harm11.   
 
(Re)-conceptualising vulnerability 
This idea of ‘vulnerability’ (or ‘adult at risk’) promulgated both by the courts and 
safeguarding law and policy more generally, then, is two dimensional – the meeting 
of an inherent characteristic, such as disability or age, with a risk of being subjected to 
some form of harm.  In essence, an individual must be vulnerable because of 
something (an internal characteristic), to something (risk of abuse or neglect).  The 
problems with this approach to vulnerability, particularly for older people, are 
multiple. If part of what renders an older person vulnerable is her age, or the 
impairments that are associated with advanced age such as frailty, or an illness like 
dementia, as has been alluded to in Watts v UK, LLBC v TH, JG and KR and Local 
Authority X v MM and KM, and cited with approval in DL, then it seems to follow that 
simply belonging to a group with that particular characteristic (i.e. old age, frailty, 
dementia) indicates that the individual is ‘vulnerable’.  While an older person, or a 
person with dementia, may experience a level of vulnerability that a younger person, 
or a person without dementia does not experience, the approach outlined above fails 
to make reference to exactly what it is about old age, or dementia, for example, that 
impacts on the ways in which an older adult experiences vulnerability12. For example, 
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an older woman with late-stage dementia who resides with her abusive husband in a 
rural area with limited access to medical treatment and facilities, and who is cared for 
by a series of different carers provided by a private care agency, will experience 
vulnerability in a different way to an older man with early stage dementia but who 
lives with his lovingly devoted wife who cares for him well, and with many high 
quality medical facilities nearby. In the first scenario, the woman’s experience of 
vulnerability may be compounded because of the different intersecting layers: her 
gender, the abuse she suffers from her husband, the lack of continuity of care, her 
geographic location and lack of facilities. The dementia of itself does not necessarily 
render her vulnerable. In other words, the current two dimensional approach criticised 
above fails to recognise the multiple sources of an older individual’s particular 
experience of vulnerability, and may therefore place the older person at risk of an 
inadequate response to ‘perceived’ sources of vulnerability.  In essence, internal 
characteristics themselves do not generate vulnerability; it is inadequate support 
mechanisms that generate the experience of vulnerability.   
 
Furthermore, the approach currently promulgated by law and policy is 
grounded in, and reinforces the essentialising and stigmatising properties of both 
vulnerability (Peroni and Timmer, 2013), and old age.  Tying vulnerability to an 
internal characteristic such as old age, or a cognitive impairment such as dementia for 
example, which are themselves loaded with negative connotations (See, for example: 
Isaksen, 2002; Johnstone, 2013; Martens, Goldenberg & Greenberg, 2005; Snyder & 
Miene, 1994), reinforces the idea that being vulnerable (or being at risk) is a ‘bad 
thing’, a weakness, a fault or something to be feared, as old age, and features or 
conditions associated with old age have come to be seen. This approach was perhaps 
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most obviously adopted in a recent judgment by Newton J, who stated that, ‘the Court 
of Protection is concerned with the weak and the vulnerable’ (emphasis added) (A 
Healthcare NHS Trust v P & Q [2015] EWCOP 15 at para. 7).  Empirical research in 
fact mirrors the recent theoretical literature on vulnerability, and suggests that many 
of those tasked with caring for older adults envisage vulnerability as a positive state 
of being (Steinbock-Hult & Sarvimäki, 2011) – a state that gives rise to opportunities 
for growth and care.  At the same time, the association between ‘traditional’ 
vulnerability and old age, also mutually reinforces the stereotypical view of old age 
itself, as well as the need for care and support in old age, as something to be feared, 
something ‘bad’, or as a negative state of being.  This outmoded approach to 
vulnerability, as Luna (2009, p. 124) argues, is a ‘simplistic answer to a complicated 
problem’; it belies the universal nature of what it is to be vulnerable, that is, 
vulnerability exists in each individual, not just those with certain characteristics.  If 
vulnerability is being at risk of a particular harm or threat, then it exists in every 
individual by virtue of our embodiment and corporeality, which renders us susceptible 
to any physical and emotional harm (Butler, 2004; Butler, 2010; Gilson, 2014).  It 
exists because of our interdependence - our relationships with others, and even 
because of the ways in which the society we inhabit may be structured – for example, 
certain power imbalances may render us susceptible to being harmed.  It is this 
particular feature of vulnerability, the idea that in order to be vulnerable you must be 
susceptible to something, that Fineman (2008) argues, in fact makes the concept a 
universal one – one that inheres in all of us, not just certain individuals based on a 
certain characteristic. This idea of vulnerability as universal, or as a quality associated 
with human corporeality, again is not purely theoretical or abstract. Recent empirical 
research suggests that this alternative conceptualisation of vulnerability in fact has 
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some practical weight - that in relation to older people, vulnerability is characterised 
by those tasked with caring for older people as simply 'being human', and furthermore 
is not only experienced by the older person as previous constructions of vulnerability 
would indicate, but is also experienced by caregivers for older adults (Steinbock-Hult 
& Sarvimäki, 2011; Sarvimäki & Steinbock-Hult, 2014). 
 
Vulnerability and the older adult 
The most recent cases that give an indication of the courts’ current approach to the 
vulnerable older adult (and vulnerability more generally) are the three cases that form 
the analysis for this paper; A Local Authority v DL, London Borough of Redbridge v 
G and NCC v PB.  DL concerned the treatment of an elderly couple (ML, 90 and 
GRL, 80) by their son, DL, with whom they lived. There had been concern by the 
Local Authority since 2005 of physical assaults, verbal threats, and controlling 
behaviour by DL, which included controlling the visits by care professionals to his 
mother, ML, as well as concerns of financial abuse (A Local Authority v DL, ML, 
GRL and JP [2011] EWHC 1022 at para. 6).  It was agreed by the Local Authority 
that neither ML nor her husband, GRL, lacked capacity as to residence and contact 
with their son under the Mental Capacity Act (although by the time proceedings 
reached the High Court it was agreed that GRL did lack capacity: A Local Authority v 
DL & Others [2011] EWHC 1022 (Fam) at para. 2), and proceedings were therefore 
commenced under the inherent jurisdiction.  The issue for the courts to determine was 
a legal one; had the inherent jurisdiction survived the implementation of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005?   In a unanimous decision the Court of Appeal held that it had.   
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Since DL, two cases in particular involving older adults have arisen where 
applications were lodged, in part, under the inherent jurisdiction on the basis of the 
older adult’s vulnerability.  London Borough of Redbridge v G concerned a lady of 
94, G, who lived with C, and C’s husband, F, to whom she had been introduced 
through membership of her local church.  There had been concerns over G’s welfare 
for a number of years following allegations that C was acting in an overbearing and 
verbally abusive manner, as well as allegations of possible financial abuse, resulting 
in five safeguarding referrals between March 2011 and May 2013.  The issues that fell 
to the Court of Protection to be determined were multiple, over a series of judgments, 
and included, inter alia, whether G had capacity as to litigation, her financial affairs, 
contact with C and F and contact with the press.  Following a determination by 
Russell J that she lacked capacity as to these issues (London Borough of Redbridge v 
G [2014] EWCOP 485), it was subsequently held that it would be in her best interests 
to place restrictions on her contact with both C and F and the press (London Borough 
of Redbridge v G [2014] EWCOP 17) and orders were granted requiring C and F to 
move out of G’s property.  
 
NCC v PB and TB concerned an application, again lodged under both the 
Mental Capacity Act and the inherent jurisdiction (in the event that PB was deemed 
not to lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act), concerning, inter alia, the 
residence13 of PB, a 79-year old woman, who had been married to TB for a number of 
years.  There were concerns over PB’s lifestyle with TB, which included unsanitary 
living conditions, being abandoned on ‘road trips’ and abusive behaviour by TB 
towards PB.  The issue to be determined by the Court was whether she lacked 
capacity to decide where to live under the Mental Capacity Act or whether her 
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decision-making was fatally impaired because of the nature of her relationship with 
TB, thereby invoking the inherent jurisdiction.  Parker J, sitting in the Court of 
Protection, found that she lacked capacity under the Mental Capacity Act, and 
authorised her residence in a care home based on this finding.  Both London Borough 
of Redbridge v G and PB then, concerned individuals with what was deemed to be an 
impairment or disturbance in the functioning or the mind or brain; G was deemed to 
have dementia, whilst PB was deemed to have residual schizophrenia or schizo-
affective disorder, a diagnosis on which the two experts could not agree (NCC v PB 
[2014] EWCOP 14 at para. 59), which led the Court of Protection in both cases to 
hold that they were not capable of satisfying the remainder of the functional test for 
capacity (s.3 Mental Capacity Act 2005).   
 
Outdated vulnerability 
At first glance, the outcome of these cases may seem intuitively appealing – the facts 
of the cases are highly emotive, and the decisions represent a desire to safeguard older 
adults from what appear to be abusive relationships, where there are unequal power 
relations at play, and as shall be shown later, recent accounts of vulnerability do not 
necessarily require the courts to take a back-seat or non-interventionist stance.   
However, the heavy reliance on outdated conceptualisations of vulnerability by the 
courts in these cases indicates that the judiciary has not made huge strides forward in 
their understanding of the vulnerable older adult.  The use of the term vulnerability as 
a descriptor in these cases illustrates this point well.  ‘Vulnerability’ in London 
Borough of Redbridge v G, for example, is frequently deployed as a descriptor 
alongside ‘old’, ‘frail’, ‘elderly’ and ‘incapacitous’. In the capacity hearing, Russell J 
describes G as an ‘old, vulnerable lady’ (London Borough of Redbridge v G [2014] 
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EWCOP 17 at para. 12).  In discussing the reporting restrictions, Russell J states that 
‘I have done so to protect the privacy of G who is old, frail and vulnerable’ (emphasis 
added) (London Borough of Redbridge v G [2014] EWCOP 485 at para. 50). In a later 
hearing, Cobb J holds that ‘There is…a legitimate public interest in the reporting of 
proceedings in the Court of Protection concerning our vulnerable, elderly and 
incapacitous. There is a separate legitimate public interest in the court protecting the 
vulnerable, elderly, and the incapacitous from public invasion into their lives’ 
(emphasis added) (London Borough of Redbridge v G (No. 2) [2014] EWCOP 959 at 
para. 19). This, again, mirrors similar descriptive approaches taken by earlier 
decisions involving older adults, outlined above.14  The association of vulnerability 
with old age, and certain corporeal or cognitive impairments associated with old age 
such as frailty or incapacity (this point will be returned to in a short while), indicates 
that the courts are deploying the term as a concept that attaches to those who 
demonstrate such characteristics. In effect, a return to the status or characteristic-
based vulnerability criticised above.   
 
This approach to vulnerability is perhaps most starkly (and worryingly) 
illustrated in PB where, in discussing whether she could have invoked the inherent 
jurisdiction if PB had not lacked capacity under the Mental Capacity Act, Parker J 
states that:  
 
"Unsoundness of mind" is not the same as "incapacity". PB has a diagnosed psychiatric 
condition which compromises her decision making. If it is not established that she lacks 
capacity this would be on the narrowest interpretation of MCA 2005 ("because of") and 
would not impinge upon her diagnosis or her vulnerability, which results from her 
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psychiatric condition. (emphasis added) (NCC v PB and TB [2014] EWCOP 14 at para. 
119) 
 
Although obiter, given that PB was deemed to lack capacity under the Mental 
Capacity Act, Parker J’s approach here is firmly rooted in the idea that vulnerability 
stems from PB’s psychiatric condition and is again reminiscent of the status based 
approach to vulnerability.  Parker J’s assertions indicate that the jurisdiction retains a 
role in respect of those who do suffer from psychiatric conditions but where their 
impairment does not mean they lack capacity under s.2(1) of the Mental Capacity 
Act15.  This, combined with the approach in London Borough of Redbridge v G, 
where vulnerability status was linked to G’s age and physical or cognitive 
characteristics, indicates that the courts in these cases continue to view vulnerability 
as resulting from an inherent characteristic, such as age, or as Parker J specifically 
states, a psychiatric condition.  Tying vulnerability to an individual’s inherent 
characteristic, such as dementia in London Borough of Redbridge v G, or her schizo-
affective disorder in PB, presents the court with a far easier task than having to 
engage with the messy reality of the various intertwined factors that contribute to their 
experience of being vulnerable at an individual level, such as PB’s attitudes towards 
marriage and her husband, or the fact that G’s reluctance to have C and F removed as 
her carers may be because she believes her home will be taken from her and she will 
be placed in her care home (London Borough of Redbridge v G [2014] EWCOP 485 
at para. 33). For the courts, it is far easier to attribute vulnerability to something 
concrete, or medical, such as their age or their psychiatric condition, than it is to try 
and navigate through a more complex set of circumstances that these two adults find 
themselves in – it is Luna’s (2009) simplistic answer to a complicated problem in a 
very practical setting.  The Court of Appeal itself in DL even acknowledges that it is 
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easier to identify internal characteristics that generate vulnerabilities, with 
MacFarlane LJ stating that ‘it is not easy to define and delineate this group of 
vulnerable adults, as, in contrast, it is when the yardstick of vulnerability relates to an 
impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain’ (DL v A Local 
Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 253 at para. 64).16 
 
In addition to this, another feature of these particular cases that demonstrate 
their steadfastness to a status or characteristic approach to vulnerability is in the way 
they characterise the relationship between ‘vulnerability’ and ‘incapacity’.  As noted 
earlier, prior to the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act, the inherent 
jurisdiction had developed to protect those whose decision-making was impaired 
because of mental incapacity. Following Re G and Munby J’s decision in Re SA, 
however, it is obvious that mental incapacity is not the only basis on which to invoke 
the jurisdiction, or upon which a person can be vulnerable.  According to Munby J in 
Re SA: 
 
[I]t can be seen that the inherent jurisdiction is no longer correctly to be 
understood as confined to cases where a vulnerable adult is disabled by mental 
incapacity from making his own decision about the matter in hand…[t]he 
jurisdiction, in my judgment, extends to a wider class of vulnerable adults. 
(Emphasis added) (Re SA at para. 76) 
 
Munby J’s approach, quoted here, is explicitly endorsed by both the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal in DL (A Local Authority v DL [2011] EWHC 1022 (Fam) at 
para. 53(4); A Local Authority v DL [2010] EWHC 2675 (Fam) at para. 19; DL v A 
Local Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 253 at para. 53).17  Although ‘the confluence of 
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mental impairment and undue influence is not all that unusual’ (Re BKR [2015] 
SGCA 26 at para. 88), as the Singaporean Court of Appeal recently noted, in the cases 
discussed here, however, the judiciary has a tendency to exhibit semantic confusion as 
to the distinction between experiencing vulnerability, particularly when experience 
abusive relationships in old age, and being incapacitated (or lacking capacity). In the 
very first paragraph of the capacity judgment in London Borough of Redbridge v G, 
Russell J phrases the issue to be determined as whether G’s lack of capacity ‘is 
because of mental impairment within the meaning of the MCA sections 2 and 3 or if 
not whether she is a vulnerable adult deprived of capacity by constraint, coercion or 
undue influence…’ (emphasis added) (London Borough of Redbridge [2014] EWCOP 
485 at para. 1).  This idea of lacking capacity because of undue influence reappears 
during Russell J’s summary of the expert psychiatric and social worker evidence; 
‘[b]oth [the social worker] and Dr Barker…share the view that G’s capacity to reach 
decisions is undermined by the influence and presence of C and F’ (emphasis added) 
(London Borough of Redbridge v G [2014] EWCOP 485 at para. 1).  Russell J, 
however, is not alone in adopting this confused approach.  A similar confusion is 
present in the arguments made by the Local Authority in DL: 
 
[Counsel’s] submissions have therefore been to delineate the extent of the 
jurisdiction so that it only covers those cases where it is necessary for the court to 
act because a person's capacity to make decisions for themselves has been 
overborne by circumstances other than those covered by the MCA 2005. 
(Emphasis added) (A Local Authority v DL [2011] EWHC 1022 (Fam) at para. 50) 
 
This argument is also one accepted by the Lord Justices in DL, with MacFarlane LJ 
stating that ‘[n]othing in the MCA 2005 makes express provision with respect to 
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individuals who may lack capacity for a reason other than an impairment of, or 
disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’ (emphasis added) (DL v A Local 
Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 253 at para. 58).18 
 
This approach is also implicit in PB.  In her summary of the expert evidence 
regarding PB’s capacity Parker J states ‘…Dr Barker is not certain about the extent to 
which PB’s decisions may be based on her beliefs about marriage, and to what extent 
TB’s influence leads her to be incapacitous all the time’ (emphasis added) (NCC v PB 
and TB [2014] EWCOP 14 at para. 63). To suggest that a vulnerable person can retain 
capacity under the Mental Capacity Act but can nevertheless be ‘incapacitated’ (and 
furthermore, incapacitated ‘all the time’) because of their vulnerability is 
disingenuous for a number of reasons.  First, from a legal standpoint it risks bringing 
in the best interests standard found under the Mental Capacity Act, with none of the 
safeguards contained therein19 into the court’s remit of responses in these cases 
(discussed in more detail below)20 - as Ruck Keene (2014) notes of the decision in 
PB, ‘how is such an approach to be distinguished from taking a decision on behalf of 
such an adult?’ It is, furthermore, worrying from an ethical standpoint.  Using the 
term ‘incapacitated’, even in its non-legal sense, shifts the ultimate reason, or even the 
‘blame’, for not being able to make an autonomous decision back to the individual 
who has been abused. Saying that an individual may be ‘incapacitated’ because of 
external forces such as coercion or undue influence indicates that it is a failure on 
their behalf that they are unable to make the decision – a defect within that 
individual’s abilities to resist external pressure, so to speak, and as we shall see later, 
risks inviting inappropriate responses, directed towards the individual who has been 
abused rather than the abuser. In a more recent decision, Re DM (Re DM [2014] 
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EWHC 3119 (Fam)), Hayden J in fact stresses the separateness of the two concepts; ‘I 
emphasise that “vulnerable” is not to be conflated with the concept of incapacitous’ 
(Re DM at para. 5), and later (Re DM at para. 10) is keen to keep separate the 
remedies available under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, from the remedies available 
under the declaratory jurisdiction for those who are vulnerable.   
 
How does the characterisation of the relationship between capacity (or 
incapacity) and vulnerability presented in DL, London Borough of Redbridge v G and 
PB support the argument presented here, namely that the courts still view 
vulnerability in relation to older people as being derived from an inherent 
characteristic? As noted earlier, in light of the Mental Capacity Act, ‘lacking 
capacity’ in one sense is now to be understood legally as stemming from a 
disturbance in the functioning in the mind or brain according to s.2(1) of the Act. 
Clear examples of such things as will be considered sufficient to fulfill this criteria are 
given in the Code of Practice to the Act, and include medical conditions such as 
dementia (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007, para. 4.12).  It is clear then, 
that lacking capacity in its most common legal usage is now linked to a medical 
condition or cognitive impairment, something that, as noted earlier, recent 
vulnerability literature seeks to move away from. Characterising vulnerability as 
being incapacitated, as the courts do here, is reminiscent of the Mental Capacity Act 
approach, and risks linking an individual’s vulnerability to an internal, often medical 
characteristic (i.e. their dementia, for example) – or reflects a ‘defect’ in an older 
individual’s ability to resist external undue influence. Indeed such an approach was 
clearly articulated in the recent Singaporean case of Re BKR (Re BKR [2015] SGCA 
26), involving the capacity of an older woman to make decisions over her property 
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and affairs and who was alleged have both a mental impairment and have been 
subjected to undue influence. The Singapore Court of Appeal held that only where 
there was no material question of the mental impairment causing the incapacity that 
the court would have no jurisdiction under the Singaporean Mental Capacity Act (Re 
BKR [2015] SGCA 26 at para. 124).  In other words, wherever there is any suspicion 
that the mental impairment was just one of the causes of the incapacity then the issue 
will be determined under the Act. As I shall argue in the next section, this approach 
may invite inappropriate responses by the courts to perceived vulnerability. 
 
Inappropriate remedies for older adults. 
In order to assess the implications for older people if the courts are committed to 
retaining an inherent characteristic, or status-based approach to vulnerability, it is 
important to contextualise the courts’ responses within the critiques and approaches to 
remedies derived from the theoretical literature.  Recent theoretical stances on 
vulnerability do not assert that interventions or responses by the state or other 
individuals are unwanted, they in fact seek to move away from a non-interventionist 
stance (Fineman, 2004).  Indeed the recent House of Lords post-legislative scrutiny 
report on the Mental Capacity Act notes on several occasions that a lack of response 
can entrench the experience of vulnerability just as much as improper responses21. 
What the recent vulnerability literature does seek to achieve, however, is to highlight 
the role that others, and, particularly for Fineman (2008; 2012) the role that the state 
plays in reducing the effects of external sources of vulnerability for older people – the 
so-called ‘responsive state’.  Mackenzie (2014) and Kohn (2014) however, go further 
than Fineman, and draw attention to the fact that in being ‘responsive’, the state can in 
itself constitute an additional source of vulnerability or further entrench an older 
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person’s experiences of vulnerability.  It has the potential for creating what 
Mackenzie terms a ‘pathogenic’ (Mackenzie, 2014, p. 39) source of vulnerability. 
This refers to the idea that socio-political or legal responses to the perceived 
‘vulnerability’ of older adults may exacerbate them, or add an additional layer of 
vulnerability to an individual’s experience. It is this feature of vulnerability that 
Clough (2014) notes is especially important, ‘as it invites a deeper analysis of the 
impact of laws and policies – their ability to achieve their stated aims and, more 
importantly, to foster resilience in those rendered vulnerable’ (Clough, 2014, p.373).  
In the context of this paper, these two aspects of the more recent vulnerability 
literature (the responsive state, and being circumspect of pathogenic vulnerability) are 
especially important as they indicate a need to consider the types of remedies imposed 
in these particular cases, and an analysis of whether such responses constitute 
pathogenic sources of vulnerability in themselves – in other words, do they entrench 
the older person’s vulnerability more than no response or an alternative response?   
This is especially pertinent to explore, in light of other recent inherent jurisdiction 
decisions which envisage its task as being ‘facilitative’ rather than ‘dictatorial’22, an 
approach that may perhaps be more in line with recent conceptualisations of how best 
to respond to vulnerability in older adults and mitigating ‘pathogenic’ vulnerability.   
 
Firstly, as argued earlier, the courts’ current approach attributes an older adult’s 
vulnerability to an inherent characteristic, and suggests that the inherent jurisdiction 
retains a role for those who suffer from psychiatric conditions but where the condition 
does not mean they lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act (see also An NHS 
Trust v Dr A [2013] EWHC 2442 (COP)).  A review of the statistics concerning the 
presence of psychiatric conditions in old age reveals why the implications of this 
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position may be extensive for older adults.  It is well recorded that the number of 
older adults with cognitive or mental impairments is increasing in England and 
Wales; the number of adults with dementia in the UK currently stands at around 
800,000 and is expected to rise to over 1 million in 2025, and nearly 2 million in 2051 
(Alzheimer’s Society, 2014, p. viii). Furthermore, it is predicted that in those over the 
age of 85, one in five will be diagnosed with dementia (Alzheimer’s Society, 2014b).  
Although perhaps the most obvious, dementia, however is not the only psychiatric 
condition that affects older adults.  Recent studies indicate that severe depression, 
anxiety disorders and lifetime alcohol disorders are also common in those over the 
age of 65 (Büchtemann, Luppa, Bramesfeld, & Riedel-Heller, 2012; Skoog, 2011; 
Volkert, Schulz, Härter, Wlodarczyk, & Andreas, 2013).  As a result of this we can 
expect increased legal activity as to their decision-making over the coming years, and 
as has been noted recently in Deprivation of Liberty Safeguard applications (Gordon, 
Goldberg & Harwood, 2015; Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2014). 
Whilst the majority of this activity may well, at present, be dealt with under the 
Mental Capacity Act, the approach of the courts in these cases indicate that even if 
those with psychiatric conditions are not necessarily found to lack capacity under the 
Mental Capacity Act, they still remain ‘vulnerable’ based on the presence of a 
psychiatric condition and could be subject to orders under the inherent jurisdiction 
regardless of the fact that they legally still have capacity. From a purely statistical 
perspective, attributing vulnerability for the purposes of the inherent jurisdiction to an 
internal characteristic such as a psychiatric condition has potentially significant 
implications for older adults – and may mean that, if they are at risk of harm, their 
decision-making may be more readily and easily scrutinised by the courts, a position 
already advanced by Munby J.23 
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Secondly, in A Local Authority v A, which involved the decision-making ability 
as to contraception of a woman with serious learning difficulties who was also in a 
seemingly overbearing marriage, as well as in LBL v RYJ, the courts held that the 
purpose of the inherent jurisdiction was ‘to facilitate the process of unencumbered 
decision-making’ (LBL v RYJ at para. 62), and to ‘create a situation where…she can 
receive outside help free of coercion to enable…her to weigh things up and decide 
freely what…she wishes to do’ (A Local Authority v A at para. 79). However the 
result of the reasoning by Parker J, outlined above, is to the effect of stating that a 
residence order could still have been placed on PB by virtue of the fact that she had a 
psychiatric condition, even if she had not lacked capacity under the Mental Capacity 
Act:24   
 
In my view the inherent jurisdiction does extend to orders for residence at a particular 
place…Assuming that it would not constitute an unlawful deprivation of liberty in my 
view I would be entitled to make an order for placement against her will pursuant to the 
inherent jurisdiction. There are serious risks to PB if she is not properly cared for or if she 
is not protected against TB. (NCC v PB and TB at paras. 121-122) 
 
Given the confusion the courts have between vulnerability and incapacity 
demonstrated above, this approach (stating that a decision made in PB’s best interests 
under the Mental Capacity Act could also be authorised by invoking the inherent 
jurisdiction) is perhaps unsurprising.  Ethically, however, it is problematic as a remedy 
imposed on PB does little to highlight and respond to the external features that may 
compromise her decision-making – preferring to respond to a threat that is based on 
her perceived inherent vulnerability, i.e. her cognitive impairment. This is, again, not 
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only at odds with remedies provided in cases such as DL, where injunctions were 
granted against the son (as opposed to the parents), but even London Borough of 
Redbridge v G, where injunctions were granted against C and F, not G, but it is even 
incompatible with previous cases such as A Local Authority v A, where undertakings 
were directed towards enabling Mrs A to make a decision as to contraception away 
from the influence of her husband.    Authorising PB’s detention in a care home based 
on her ‘inherent’ source of vulnerability may in fact render her susceptible to other 
(pathogenic) sources of vulnerability. Given the value she places on her marriage, she 
may feel disempowered or exposed based on not being able to reside with her 
husband, or in her own home – an aspect of moving to care homes that is frequently 
reported by older people in empirical research (Biedenharn & Normoyle, 1991; Gott, 
Seymour, Bellamy, Clark & Ahmedzai, 2004; Lee, 1997; Lloyd, Calnan, Cameron, 
Seymour & Smith, 2014) or she may even develop negative relationships with staff in 
the care home, even more likely given her original reluctance to live there. 
 
Finally, and as touched upon earlier, the approach taken by Parker J may also be 
seen as envisaging a ‘best interests’ approach for the inherent jurisdiction.  Apart from 
being paternalistic, a criticism often levied at any ‘best interests’ standard (Dunn, 
Clare, Holland & Gunn, 2007; Fennell, 2008; Szerletics, 2012)25, this type of approach 
is problematic both legally26, and theoretically, in light of the aims of the recent 
vulnerability literature on a number of counts, particularly for older people.  If A Local 
Authority v A and LBL v RYJ are correct, then ‘the goal of the jurisdiction is to 
safeguard decision making, rather than to safeguard well-being per se’ (Keywood, 
2011, p.331).  If this is indeed the case, then the proper remit of the jurisdiction is to 
facilitate maximally autonomous decision-making for older adults and a ‘best interests 
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approach’ does not necessarily sit comfortably with the aims of vulnerability theory 
for older people, which emphasise empowerment and self-development, and therefore 
recognising effective ways in which we can promote such responses among the older 
population, as opposed to taking decision-making out of their hands (Fineman, 2012; 
Hall, 2014).  A more nuanced vulnerability approach for older individuals focuses our 
attention on the ‘conditions necessary for developing and maintaining [a specific set 
of] capacities’ (Dodds, 2007, p.504).  The decision in PB, however, arguably fails to 
recognise this in a way that is empowering for PB herself, by stating that whilst the 
inherent jurisdiction ‘exists to protect, liberate and enhance personal autonomy…[t]o 
be maintained in optimum health, safe, warm, free from physical indignity and cared 
for is in itself an enhancement of autonomy’ (NCC v PB and TB at para. 113).  While 
it may be argued that this is correct from an objective standpoint, the way someone 
should want to make a decision objectively is irrelevant, the relevant issue framed by 
more nuanced accounts of vulnerability is how PB herself wants to make a decision, 
and calls for a legal response that supports this decision-making process.  In particular 
the approach demonstrated by the courts explicitly derides the value she places on her 
marriage and her ability to reside with her husband, notwithstanding his controlling 
behaviour, and arguable lack of understanding of her medical needs.  At paragraph 63, 
cited earlier, for example, Parker suggests that she is uncertain as ‘to what extent TB’s 
influence leads her to be incapacitous all the time’ (emphasis added), and at other 
points indicates that she needs ‘protection’ from her husband because she is at risk 
(NCC v PB at para. 71).   In the context of the inherent jurisdiction, a responsive 
vulnerability theory requires a consideration of the subjective experiences of the older 
adult - it does not necessarily seek to escape value judgments or interference, but 
recommends that legal responses make such judgments from the subjective point of 
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view of the older adult at the heart of the proceedings, rather than from an objective 
stance.  This point becomes particularly salient when we reflect upon the multiplicity 
and diversity of factors that older people take into consideration when making 
decisions about their care (Brown, 2011; Cicirelli, 1998; Fried & Bradley, 2004; 
Pritchard-Jones, 2014).  Comparing these three cases highlights this particular point 
well.  In PB, PB is an individual that clearly values her interdependence and marriage 
to her husband over and above many other factors.  In contrast, G, in London Borough 
of Redbridge v G values her independence – as well as her interdependence from the 
relationship with her fellow churchgoers.  In DL it was uncertain, even doubtful, that 
any of the three parties concerned wanted the litigation. ML at the very least did not 
want proceedings brought in respect of her relationship with her son, and whilst it was 
not so certain that this was the case for her husband, GRL, it was uncertain how much 
he would want to go against his wife’s wishes. 
 
So what types of remedies would a responsive vulnerability analysis have envisaged?  
How could the courts have reacted more appropriately in the cases critiqued in this 
article?  To put this question bluntly, how could the courts have responded to the 
situation encountered by GRL and ML, G and PB, in a more ‘vulnerability-friendly’ 
manner?  One suggestion that emerges from this analysis would be to simply remove 
the requirement under the Mental Capacity Act that incapacity must be because of an 
impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or the brain (Mental 
Capacity Act s.2(1)).27 This would have the benefit of retaining the safeguards 
contained in the Act itself for such cases, and the aspects of the Act that the House of 
Lords post-legislative scrutiny were in favour of, but removing the association 
between incapacity and impairment, thereby making the Act itself applicable to 
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situations where an individual’s decision-making is threatened by elder abuse. This 
would mean that cases such as these could be decided under the Act, but without the 
artificiality of having to establish the causal nexus between the diagnostic element and 
the functional element of lacking capacity – thereby potentially encompassing DL-type 
facts. Even at first glance, however, there are potentially a number of problems with 
this suggestion.  Firstly, removing this requirement from the Act does not itself 
automatically render the Act relevant to instances of elder abuse – the question 
remains ‘at what point does the state intervene in such cases’? Removing this aspect of 
the Act simply requires us to establish an alternative threshold over and above which 
the state will consider it necessary to intervene. As such, if this is a viable option, then 
more work must be done on how to establish what would then be the necessary 
boundaries of the Mental Capacity Act, or even whether such boundaries are legally 
realisable.  Neither does such an approach conquer the problems that are encountered 
when faced with ‘best interests’ decision-making – it would continue to take decision-
making out of an older person’s hands and place it in the hands of the state – an 
approach rejected by the recent vulnerability literature.  Moreover, neither does such 
an approach adequately address the concerns raised earlier regarding the ethical 
implications of conflating external threats to decision-making such as abuse, with 
perceived internal ‘failures’, such as impaired functional capabilities. 
 
Finally, given that the Mental Capacity Act ‘is concerned with enabling the 
court to do for the patient what he could do for himself if of full capacity, but it goes 
no further…the court has no greater powers than the patient would have if he were of 
full capacity’ (Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] 
UKSC 67, at para. 18), an alternative suggestion would be to retain the inherent 
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jurisdiction for cases such as these, but make greater use of the breadth of remedies 
available under the jurisdiction. In London Borough of Redbridge v G, it is welcoming 
to note the local authority’s assurances of home-care for G, given her fears about 
moving to a care home (London Borough of Redbridge v G [2014] EWCOP 17 at para. 
43), and the Court’s emphasis on re-integrating G with her church community 
(London Borough of Redbridge v G [2014] EWCOP 17 at para. 83), as well as the 
removal of C and F from G’s home. However given the clearly detrimental effect both 
C’s conduct and the legal proceedings had on G, and the court’s rejection of her 
consistently expressed wishes for C and F to remain in her home, perhaps the court 
could also have explicitly considered the possibility of offering ongoing emotional 
support and advice, such as counselling, to the extent that G would have been willing 
and able to accept such offers, and to the extent that these are not already provided 
within the care package available to G.  Similarly in PB, rather than simply authorising 
her residence in a care home with limited supervised contact with her husband (NCC v 
PB at para. 123), the court could potentially have explored alternative options such as 
providing secure community living arrangements and an appropriate care package, as 
well as less restricted contact with TB.  These suggestions may be, in principle, more 
sensitive to the ‘responsive state’ envisaged by Fineman. In light of the recent decision 
in Re MN (Re MN [2015] EWCA Civ 411), however, where the Court of Appeal held 
that the Court of Protection ‘…has no more power, just because it is acting on behalf 
of an adult who lacks capacity, to obtain resources or facilities from a third 
party…than the adult if he had capacity would be able to obtain himself’ (Re MN 
[2015] EWCA Civ 411 at para. 80), it may be that the courts are progressively moving 
in the opposite direction, at least where an individual lacks capacity under the Mental 
Capacity Act. It remains to be seen whether the court would take this line if faced with 
 31	  
a similar case under the inherent jurisdiction, and if it did, then this would also 
indicate that the jurisdiction’s remedies are not ‘theoretically limitless’, after all.     
 
Concluding remarks 
‘Society must guard against excesses that might ironically deny the elderly their 
autonomy by forcing it upon them’ (Kapp, 1989, p.5). This was the warning issued by 
Marshall Kapp in 1989.  Following DL there does seem to be a clear commitment to 
retain the inherent jurisdiction to safeguard the decision-making of older adults, 
particularly for those who have been the victims of ‘elder abuse’, but the argument 
presented in this paper is that the court’s approach to the vulnerable older adult is 
confused, and remains grounded in historical and outdated ideas of what it means to 
be ‘vulnerable’.  Moving forward in developing the jurisdiction for the vulnerable 
older adult who may be the victim of ‘elder abuse’, the courts may be wise to heed 
Kapp’s warning.  In turn, this paper suggests that the retention of the jurisdiction is 
not necessarily unwelcome28 and may well be more flexible than the Mental Capacity 
Act in responding to compromised decision-making for older adults who experience 
abuse, but in order to be that responsive a more nuanced understanding of what it 
means to be vulnerable, and in particular what it means to be a vulnerable older 
person is required. Given the fledgling nature of the post-Mental Capacity Act cases 
on the scope of the inherent jurisdiction, the arguments put forward here are tentative, 
but in turn serve to highlight broader ethical and legal issues for further research.  
What is the interplay between the jurisdiction, vulnerability and human rights 
principles?  Can the inherent jurisdiction provide a better, more appropriate way of 
thinking about cases of ‘fluctuating capacity’, such as dementia? Unfortunately only 
when the courts begin to engage the jurisdiction rather than forcing such cases under 
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the Mental Capacity Act will these areas open up for discussion, and will we be able 
to envisage a more responsive judiciary.  At present, however, we will have to wait 
and see just how ‘responsive’, and in what way, the courts are willing to become. 	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1 The Serious Crime Act 2015 has also recently received Royal Assent, and criminalises coercive or 
controlling behaviour in intimate or family relationships (S. 76, Serious Crime Act 2015). Given that 
this is yet to be enacted, it remains to be seen to what extent this provision will also support the 
obligations incumbent on local authorities by virtue of the Care Act. 
 
2 It is worth noting at the outset that only DL was in fact decided using the jurisdiction.  London 
Borough of Redbridge v G and PB were decided under the Mental Capacity Act, but nevertheless PB 
contained lengthy discussion of the jurisdiction before its ultimate rejection, and London Borough of 
Redbridge v G provided interesting comments on vulnerability.  This point, and the difficulty it 
presents in blurring the legal boundaries of ‘capacity’ and ‘vulnerability’ will also be discussed further 
in this paper. 
 
3 Whilst aim of the paper is to examine the construction of the ‘vulnerable older adult’ in these cases, 
and examine the broader legal implications of this for the development of the inherent jurisdiction 
more generally, the arguments presented may apply to other ‘groups’ traditionally considered 
vulnerable, and how these particular cases interplay with other inherent jurisdiction cases will form a 
key feature of the analysis.   
 
4 Hale J held that the declaratory jurisdiction could only be invoked to protect a legal right and not to 
limit an individual’s freedom of association. To this effect, Hale J explains a legal right in the context 
of this particular case by stating that ‘It is access, or freedom of association, rather than harassment, or 
freedom from association, which is protected under English law’ (emphasis in original): 
Cambridgeshire County Council v R (An Adult) ([1995] 1 FLR 50 at p.52).  She goes on to say that ‘[i]t 
is clear…from the troubling circumstances of this case that there exists no wholly appropriate legal 
mechanism for examining whether or not W should be free to make her own decisions in the vital 
matter of her relationship with her family… it is a sad state of affairs that the law is unable to provide 
suitable protection in such a situation’: Cambridgeshire County Council v R (An Adult) ([1995] 1 FLR 
50 at p.56). 
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5 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L ([1999] 1 AC 458) was 
subsequently ruled unlawful by the European Court of Human Rights in HL v UK ([2004] ECHR 471), 
which led to the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards being inserted into the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
by the Mental Health Act 2007.  More recently, however, see An NHS Trust v Dr A [2013] EWHC 
2442 (COP). 
 
6 This approach was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in DL. It is also important to note the broad brush 
that Munby J takes to this idea of vulnerability, though.  Despite this definition, he also states that it is 
difficult to delineate the group he considers vulnerable (Re SA at para. 77), he also said that the 
definition he’s given is ‘descriptive, not definitive; indicative rather than prescriptive’ (Re SA at para. 
82).  The particular wording used by Munby J also mirrors the statutory approach under s.29(1) of the 
National Assistance Act 1948, although the Act does not use the term ‘vulnerability’ explicitly, section 
29(1) states that ‘[a] local authority shall have power to make arrangements for promoting the welfare 
of persons…who are blind, deaf or dumb, and other persons who are substantially and permanently 
handicapped by illness, injury, or congenital deformity or such other disabilities as may be prescribed 
by the Minister.’  I would like to thank Kirsty Keywood for bringing this point to my attention. 
 
7  Adopting the language of the Wolfenden Report; (Committee on Homosexual Offences and 
Prostitution, 1957) cited by Munby J in Local Authority X v MM and KM [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam) at 
[128]. 
 
8 The language used by the Court is adopted from the Jolley (2003) Report. 
 
9 This approach itself was adopted from Who Decides (Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1997), the green 
paper on decision-making for mentally incapacitated adults, which ultimately led to the enactment of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
 
10  What exactly the Act means by ‘enquiries’, however, is left unexplained; the guidance for 
implementation simply refers to ‘whatever enquiries [the local authority] thinks necessary to decide 
what if any action needs to be taken and by whom’ (Department of Health, 2014, para. 14.57) and 
explains that ‘enquiry’ could mean any number of things from an informal chat with the individual in 
question, right through to a ‘much more formal multi-agency plan or course of action’ (Department of 
Health, 2014, para. 14.64).  Secondly, the Act repeals s.47 of the National Assistance Act 1948, which 
provided local authorities with a power of removal of a vulnerable adult, but does not replace this with 
any other provisions such as a power of entry.  In this respect the Care Act arguably falls short in 
comparison with the provisions in both the Scottish (Adult Support and Protection (Scotland) Act 
2007) and Welsh (Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014) legislation: (Fitzgerald and Ruck 
Keene, 2014). 
 
11 The approach to vulnerability based on the presence of internal characteristics is not one that is 
peculiar to social welfare law and policy, though.  For example, the current offences of willful neglect 
or ill-treatment found in section 44 of the Mental Capacity Act and s.127 of the Mental Health Act 
1983 are ones that apply when a person lacks capacity, or the perpetrator reasonably believed that 
person lacked capacity (i.e. because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the 
mind or brain according to section 2(1)), or when an individual is being treated for a mental health 
disorder.  This remains the legal position until sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act 2015, which provide for general offences of willful neglect or ill-treatment by health care workers 
or health care providers, enter in to force. For a critique of the scope of the current offences, as well as 
their utility, see: Alghrani, Brazier, Farrell, Griffiths and Allen, (2011); House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Report of Session 2013-14, (2014) at paras. 301-309; 
Hansard, HL Deb 10 March 2015, Vol 760, Col 631.  Similarly, the offence of causing or allowing the 
death of a vulnerable adult under section 5 of the Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004 
applies only to an adult who is ‘vulnerable’ under its terms; ‘a person aged 16 or over whose ability to 
protect himself from violence, abuse or neglect is significantly impaired through physical or mental 
disability or illness, through old age or otherwise’ (S.5(6)).  Likewise a similar definition is to be found 
in the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 section 56(9) which states that an individual may be 
vulnerable if, inter alia, he has ‘particular needs because of his age’, ‘has any form of disability’ or 
‘has a physical or mental health problem’ (S.56(9)(a)-(c)). Dunn et al. (2008) also note the use of this 
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characterisation of vulnerability not only in relation to the inherent jurisdiction but also to ‘vulnerable 
witnesses’ in the criminal justice system. 
 
12 The use of the phrase ‘experience vulnerability’ as opposed to ‘be vulnerable’ is important here.  On 
the account of vulnerability presented here, it is important to distinguish between the two.  More recent 
vulnerability theory, which emphasises the role of external factors, align more to an understanding of 
vulnerability as being experienced, however an account of vulnerability that looks at an internal 
characteristic (which more recent accounts, including the one advanced here) gives the overwhelming 
impression that vulnerable is something an individual can ‘be’.  It is the former understanding of 
vulnerability that this article adheres to and as such the term ‘experience vulnerability’ is deliberately 
used here. 
 
13 There was also a question over PB’s refusal of an endoscopy, however this was not ultimately an 
issue to be decided by the court as PB voluntarily underwent the procedure (NCC v PB and TB at para. 
124).  
 
14 See in particular the judgment of Munby J in Local Authority X v MM and KM at para. 120: ‘The fact 
is that all life involves risk, and the young, the elderly and the vulnerable, are exposed to additional 
risks and to risks they are less well equipped than others to cope with.’ 
 
15 If this the case, then we could question whether it is accurate, from an administrative point of view, as 
counsel for DL did on appeal (DL v A Local Authority (2012) EWCA Civ 253 at paras. 36-39), but which 
was rejected by the Lord Justices (DL v A Local Authority (2012) EWCA Civ 253 at para. 57-63) 
 
16 This functional approach has also been heavily criticised by the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities: ‘it presumes to be able to accurately assess the inner-workings of the human mind 
and, when the person does not pass the assessment, it then denies him or her a core human right’: UN 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment 1, CRPD/C/GC/1 at para. 15. 
 
17 It is precisely because vulnerability differs from mental incapacity that the courts in both Re G and 
Re SA felt the need to make the declarations it did; neither G nor SA lacked mental capacity, but both 
were at risk of harm. In G’s case it was the risk of losing her capacity again should she have 
unrestricted contact with her father, and for SA it was the risk of harm if she was forced to enter in to a 
marriage.  
   
18  This is despite earlier references to vulnerability that MacFarlane LJ makes, which align 
vulnerability to autonomy, rather than capacity: ‘The jurisdiction…is in part aimed at enhancing or 
liberating the autonomy of a vulnerable adult whose autonomy has been compromised by a reason 
other than mental incapacity…’ (DL v A Local Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 253 at para. 54).  This 
latter conceptualisation of vulnerability as pertaining to autonomy may be more in line with recent 
theoretical accounts. 
 
19 For example, the decision made must be carried out in the least restrictive way (Mental Capacity Act 
S1(6)), or the list of relevant factors to be considered when making the decision (S.4(6)). 
 
20 The legal consequences of this approach were argued forcefully by counsel for DL (DL v A Local 
Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 253 at paras. 36-41), although this argument was not accepted by the 
Lord Justices.  See also Hewson (2013).  
 
21 House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Report of Session 2013-14, 
(2014) at paras. 3, 16 and 60.  
 
22 In particular I discuss the difference between the approach of the courts in the cases that form the 
focus of this paper, in comparison with the approach in LBL v RYJ and A Local Authority v A ([2010] 
EWHC 1549 (Fam)). It is also important to note, however, that the arguments put forward here do not 
advocate for a non-interventionist approach i.e. a reinforcement of the public-private divide. What this 
article seeks to highlight is that intrusion may be welcome, but vulnerability theory has the potential for 
illustrating more appropriate types of remedies. 
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23 ‘[A]n adult who is vulnerable is more likely to fall into the category of the incapacitated in relation to 
whom the inherent jurisdiction is exercisable than an adult who is not vulnerable. So it is likely to be 
easier to persuade the court that there is a case calling for investigation where the adult is apparently 
vulnerable than where the adult is not on the face of it vulnerable’ (Re SA at para. 83). 
 
24 And, furthermore, would still have been compliant with article 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Her reference to ‘unsound mind’ is in light of the requirements of article 5(1)(e) of the 
European Convention, which stipulates that a person may be deprived of their liberty in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law if they are of unsound mind.  We can question how wide the court in PB 
envisages the term ‘unsoundness of mind’ and whether this would, then, extend beyond those who have 
psychiatric conditions to also include those who have been subjected to coercion or undue influence - an 
analysis of how broad ‘unsoundness of mind’ may be framed is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however it is worth noting that the Winterwerp criteria require someone of unsound mind to be 
suffering from a ‘true medical disorder’ established by ‘objective medical expertise’ (Winterwerp v The 
Netherlands [1979] 2 EHRR 387 at para. 39). 
 
25 Despite these criticisms, the recent House of Lords Select Committee post-legislative scrutiny report 
was generally supportive of the Mental Capacity Act, and the best interests principle: House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Report of Session 2013-14 (2014) at paras. 90-101 
 
26 Although outside the scope of this article, it is important to note that without any provision of review 
for PB’s detention, this approach subverts the current procedural requirements that exist under the 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards and may also therefore be unlawful under the European Court of 
Human Rights ruling in HL v UK ([2004] ECHR 471).  Had this case been decided under the inherent 
jurisdiction, however, and Parker J had put in place measures for the court to review her detention (as 
happened in An NHS Trust v Dr. A, then this approach, being more stringent procedurally than the 
review mechanisms found in the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, may in fact be more human rights 
compliant. I would like to thanks Beverley Clough for drawing my attention to this last point. 
 
27 I would like to thank Paul Skowron for highlighting this possibility. 
 
28 Indeed abandoning the inherent jurisdiction as a means of safeguarding decision-making for older 
people could potentially be in violation of state obligations under article 8 of the European Convention, 
as the Court of Appeal held in DL ([2012] EWCA Civ 253 at para. 66). For an argument that the 
jurisdiction may certainly be better equipped for dealing with the capacity of adults with mental 
impairments to consent to sexual relations see Clough (2014). 
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